We’re proud to highlight the work of one of our Nuclear Non-Proliferation team members through his thoughtful and deeply insightful writing. His piece explores critical perspectives that continue to shape conversations around global security and policy. To continue reading and support his work directly, we’ve also linked his full Substack piece within the blog. We encourage you to explore it in full-
There’s been a lot of talk about Iran’s nuclear research program and the status of approximately 900 pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU). This technology has been around for literally decades. North Korea figured out how to build a nuclear device, and if Iran decided to go down that path, its scientists and engineers could figure it out also.
One of the hard lines of the administration has been to ensure that Iran does not have HEU for the purposes of building a bomb. To be clear, Iran does have the right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to enrich uranium for the purposes of commercial and medical needs. But what path exactly would lead to Iran surrendering its HEU to the United States?
I suggest there are three broad possibilities, based upon whether Iran’s current regime is cooperating, whether the United States knows where the HEU is, and whether the HEU is in one location or several. Right now, it is suspected that all of the HEU is stored at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. But what if they moved it?
- Iran’s regime could come to a cease-fire and, through negotiations, surrender its HEU to an international IAEA team that didn’t have any U.S. participants. They might agree to sending the HEU to the United States or Russia to be blended into nuclear fuel for power reactors. Iran might insist on maintaining the right to enrich uranium and a lifting of all economic sanctions.
- Iran’s regime could continue the fight against the United States, with the president deciding to send in a large ground force (5-6000 troops) to secure Isfahan and spend a few weeks digging out the HEU from the collapsed tunnels. This would also assume a heavy air presence to provide support to the ground troops, who probably would be under fire the whole time. Expect significant U.S. casualties.
- Iran’s regime could collapse, but not before they move the HEU to five or six undisclosed locations throughout its country. This would force a major military operation, much larger than the 2003 invasion of Iraq, to subdue the IRGC military units that would undoubtedly still be in power and to hunt down the HEU.
I submit that no one wants the second or third scenario. While dissuading Iran from developing a nuclear weapon is important, there is no deadline by which the HEU must be transferred out of the country. The best opportunity for both Iran and the United States is to come to a cooperative agreement and use existing international channels to defuse the situation. Going in with military forces for the sake of obtaining what is a relatively small amount of special nuclear material just isn’t worth the blood of U.S. military forces.
For a more detailed discussion on this topic, please see my Substack post at Here’s How the U.S. Govt Could Get Iran’s HEU